A Robust Algorithm for Sniffing BLE Long-Lived Connections in Real-time by Sarkar, Sopan et al.
1A Robust Algorithm for Sniffing BLE Long-Lived
Connections in Real-time
Sopan Sarkar, Jianqing Liu, Emil Jovanov
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Alabama in Huntsville, Huntsville, Alabama 35758 USA
Email: {sopan.sarkar, jianqing.liu, emil.jovanov}@uah.edu
Abstract—Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) has become an in-
trinsic wireless technology for the Internet of Things (IoT). With
the proliferation of BLE-embedded IoT devices, it is important to
study the security and privacy implications of BLE. The forefront
attack to BLE devices is the wireless sniffing attack, which
would lead to more detrimental threats like jamming, encryption
cracking or system penetration. Existing sniffing attacks are
based on the correct detection of BLE connection initiation
state, but they become ineffective for BLE long-lived connections.
In this paper, we focus on the adversary setting with a low-
cost single radio and develop a suite of real-time algorithms to
determine the key parameters necessary to follow and sniff a BLE
connection in the connected state. We implement our algorithms
in the open source platform —Ubertooth One and evaluate its
performance in terms of sniffing overhead and accuracy. By
comparing with state-of-the-art schemes, experimental results
show that our sniffer achieves much higher sniffing accuracy
(over 80%) and better stability to BLE operational dynamics.
Index Terms—Bluetooth Low Energy, Sniffing, Security, Adap-
tive Frequency Hopping.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, Bluetooth has evolved continuously,
creating innovative ways for things to connect. BLE was
first introduced in version 4.0 of the Bluetooth Standard [1].
It differs from classic Bluetooth with respect to modulation
mode and link layer packet format, and was developed mainly
targeting low power embedded devices.
Due to its ubiquitous presence, reliability [2], significant
reduction in energy consumption and mesh networking capa-
bility [3], BLE has become the dominant wireless connectivity
standard for IoT. In 2018 alone, 4.7 billion BLE devices were
shipped which is estimated to double by 2020 [4]. Such a wide
adoption rate unfortunately raises security and privacy alarm.
For instance, BLE fitness trackers could become the target
by adversaries for location tracking [5]; cellphone could be
hijacked by injecting malformed packets via BLE interface
[6]. Thus, it becomes imperative to assess the security and
privacy implications of BLE devices.
Bluetooth specification defines several security mechanisms
for authentication and link layer security, but it is often seen
that developers ignore these security measures to trade for
design simplicity and to obtain fast market access. There is
some well-documented case of attacks on BLE devices that
comprise of intervening BLE connections, stealing private
information [7]–[9] and jamming [10]. These active attacks,
although detrimental, can be easily detected by intrusion
detection systems [11], [12].
An interesting but fully unexplored attack is the BLE
sniffing, which is stealthy and intends to compromise user
privacy or cause further system penetration. However, it is very
difficult to sniff and follow a BLE connection because BLE
employs the adaptive frequency hopping (AFH) spread spec-
trum scheme where it rapidly switches the carrier frequency in
a pseudo-random manner. The parameters for determining the
AFH pattern are only exchanged during the establishment of
connection in the initiating state. Moreover, to avoid power in-
terference in ISM band, AFH frequently modifies the hopping
pattern which makes it even more difficult to sniff.
There are several possible ways to sniff a BLE connection.
One way is to use wide-band sniffers that can sniff multiple
channels at a time. This may not be prohibitively expensive to
less-capable adversaries (e.g., $25K for a Bluetooth protocol
analyzer [13]). There also exist some low-cost, open source
but narrow-band sniffers [14]–[16] which either requires to
establish a connection with the BLE victim device or observe
the establishment of a BLE connection to extract the AFH
parameters. If BLE victim devices are already in connected
state, one way is to jam the connection and force it to re-pair
and thus observe the AFH parameters [17]. Such an attack
is known as re-pair attack and as stated earlier can be easily
detected and avoided by intrusion detection systems. More-
over, such jamming is ineffective as the attacker has no idea
of the BLE hopping pattern (unless it jams all BLE channels).
In addition to that, due to advertisements on 3 channels, the
probability of detecting the connection parameters decreases
to 33.3%. This is even greatly reduced in the presence of co-
channel interference.
In this paper, we investigate the stealthy sniffing of a BLE
connection that has been established for a while. We present
the design, implementation, and evaluation of our algorithm
that utilizes a single-channel and low-cost radio device for
determining the BLE AFH pattern. The algorithm basically
observes a single channel at a time and determines the AFH
parameters namely connection interval cint , hop increment
hinc and the channel map cmap in real-time. Next, we im-
plement our design in the open source platform —Ubertooth
One [18] and evaluate its performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the most recent literatures on this topic. Section
III provides background on BLE communication focusing
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2on the link layer specification. The proposed algorithms for
determining the BLE AFH parameters are described in Section
IV. We describe our experimental methodology and evaluate
its performance in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Bluetooth has enjoyed high penetration rate in smartphones
and consumer electronics in recent years. This has sparked
interest among researchers to look into the privacy and security
implications of Bluetooth. BlueEar [19] is a (classic) Bluetooth
traffic sniffer developed based on a dual-radio architecture.
One of the radios called scout hops through all the channels
to monitor interference and target’s packet transmission, which
is then used by the other radio called the snooper to hop and
follow the target. The system uses probabilistic clock matching
algorithm to determine basic hopping pattern, and statistical
model with a lightweight machine learning algorithm to pre-
dict adaptive hopping behavior. Their method shows a packet
capture rate of 90% in a real-world environment.
With the recent growth of interest in IoT devices, the focus
of deployment quickly shifted towards BLE. BLE specification
presents security mechanisms for device authentication, data
encryption and redundancy checks at the link layer. However,
recent studies have shown the possibility to bypass such
security measures. Das et al. in [20] demonstrate how BLE
traffic of fitness trackers can be correlated with the intensity
of user’s activity and thus be used to identify and track him/her
in the crowd. In Das’s experiment, they use off-the-shelf,
expensive and proprietary packet sniffers to observe control
packets from all three advertisement channels.
Aforementioned sniffing attacks are based on multi-radio
platforms which could be prohibitively expensive for less-
capable adversaries. Currently, one popular platform —Uber-
tooth One is an open-source, single-radio and cheap Bluetooth
sniffer that was developed by Ryan et al. [17]. This is a
powerful sniffer that is relied on observing advertisement
packets and looking for AFH parameters to follow. As stated
earlier it is difficult to sniff a BLE connection after the
connection has been already established. In [17], Ryan et al.
imply how AFH parameters can be extracted from a long-
lived BLE connection via jamming. Moreover, Ryan et al.
also demonstrate a proof-of-concept of key re-negotiation and
man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack to BLE devices.
Bluetooth Low Energy Multi (BLE-Multi) [21] is a firmware
extension to Ubertooth One which enables tracking of multiple
simultaneous long-lived connections. It uses transmission of
empty packets to determine the anchor point of each connec-
tion event and connection timing. Moreover, it achieves multi-
connection sniffing by opportunistically switching between
connections when they move from active to sleep mode.
Similar researches include the work by Cheng et al. [22] which
demonstrate an attack to IEEE 802.15.4e (Zigbee) where they
crack the TSCH channel hopping algorithm based on a wide-
band receiver to monitor all the channels.
Our work is similar to that of Ryan’s, but we consider a
more realistic environment and tackles all the complexities
associated with it. One of the important assumptions made by
Ryan during his demonstration is that BLE connections use all
37 data channels, but in reality this is not the case due to AFH.
Therefore, the algorithms provided by Ryan perform poorly in
the practical environment. In this work, we consider a realistic
situation where BLE adopts adaptive frequency hopping and
the connection has been established for a while. Our algorithm
is designed to extract the AFH parameters on-the-fly. Though
our algorithm is deployed on the Ubertooth One platform, it
is platform independent and can be deployed on any system.
III. BLE PRELIMINARIES
BLE operates in the 2.4 GHz ISM band at frequency 2408 –
2483.5 MHz. The whole spectrum is divided into 40 channels
with 2 MHz spacing and indexed from 0 to 39. Among these
channels, three channels (channel 37, 38 and 39) are used
for advertising and the rest 37 channels are used for data
communications. In this section, we will provide an overview
of the BLE advertising and data communication process.
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the BLE Link Layer states
along with the communication process. A device in the standby
state does not transmit or receive packets. When a device is
in advertising state, it continuously broadcasts advertisement
packets in the advertising channels. The BLE specification
recommends to use all three advertising channels, but any
manufacturer can use less than three channels for energy
efficiency at the cost of reliability. Advertisements (a.k.a.,
beacons) are sent periodically at Ta intervals, which consist
of a fixed delay of 20ms – 10.24s and a random delay of 0
– 10ms. The random delay ensures the reduction of collision
of advertisement packets from multiple devices. Both BLE
advertisement and data packets have the same format that
contains a preamble, access address (AA), packet data unit
(PDU) and cyclic redundancy check (CRC). The AA for the
advertisement packets is fixed (0x8E89BED6) and for the
data packets, it varies for each connection. The time interval
between two consecutive packets on the same channel is 150us
and is denoted by DIFS .
A device in the scanning state continuously listens to adver-
tisement packets. It may query further information from the ad-
vertiser through a scan request (SCAN_REQ) packet, to which
the advertiser responds with a scan response (SCAN_RSP)
message.
When a device wants to establish a connection, it goes
to the initiating state and sends a connection request packet
(CONNECT_REQ) to the advertiser that contains the required
parameters to establish the connection. When the request is
accepted by the advertiser, both the devices go to the connected
state. The first regular connection event is scheduled after
dtwo + dtwd time from the CONNECT_REQ and within
the dtw interval. In this state, the advertiser takes the slave
role whereas the initiator as the master. In the connected
state, BLE devices hop to a new channel every cint time
interval to exchange packets following the channel selection
algorithm as specified in the BLE specification. The cint is
selected between 7.5ms to 4s through negotiation between
the master and slave. The BLE channel selection algorithm
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Figure 1: BLE Link Layer states with connection estab-
lishment procedure and data flow.
is used to select the next channel to be hopped to. It takes
in three parameters: cmap , hinc and last unmapped channel
luc. The cmap is a bit sequence of 40 bits corresponding to
the 40 BLE channels. It classifies the channels as Used and
Unused based on the master’s channel assessment algorithm.
If a channel is Used, a bit value of ‘1’ is assigned to its
position value and vice versa. For any BLE connection, the
minimum number of channels to be used is two. The hinc is a
number randomly selected between 5 and 16 which specifies
the number of channels to be skipped on each hop. It is to
be noted that for a particular connection the cint and hinc
remains constant. The cmap can be updated through a channel
map update request packet (LL_CHANNEL_MAP_REQ). The
BLE channel selection algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: BLE channel selection algorithm.
IV. REAL-TIME BLE SNIFFING ALGORITHM
A. System Model
We consider an indoor environment where BLE devices
have limited mobility, if not fully static. Most BLE devices
are in the connected state to exchange data while some of
them could be in advertisement state to broadcast beacon
signals. For the former ones, AFH is employed to select carrier
frequency to transmit data whereas the latter ones follow fixed
frequency hopping pattern (channel 37 → 38 → 39 → 37) to
broadcast messages. All BLE devices (v4.0 or beyond) apply
128-bit AES for payload encryption but the packet header is
in plaintext.
B. Attack Model
Suppose an adversary, Eve, stays in close proximity to
victim BLE devices (e.g., in the same building). Eve has
limited resources in terms of accessible equipments and
computation capability. Specifically, we assume Eve carries
a single-radio sniffer with a simple protocol analyzer like
Wireshark. The adversarial objective is to follow a target BLE
device’s connection and sniff its airborne packets, which could
lead to location tracking. Although the attack is passive and
stealthy, Eve may latter launch jamming attacks to disconnect
the connection or inject malformed packets to take over victim
BLE devices. For those in the advertisement state, sniffing
is trivial. The challenge to Eve is to crack the target’s AFH
pattern when it is in the connected state, which is the focus
of this work.
C. Real-time BLE Sniffing Algorithms
Here is the overview of our idea. First, Eve stays on a
BLE channel and filters out the target via its AA or MAC
address in the plaintext header. Next, Eve attempts to crack
AFH pattern by determining cint , hinc and cmap one after
another. The nature of AFH parameters is that cint and hinc
are constant for an established connection while cmap varies
over time depending on the power interference level. As a
result, the update of cmap would totally change the hopping
pattern and thus making it difficult to sniff a BLE connection.
In what follows, we discuss how to address this challenge and
derive corresponding AFH parameters.
1) Determining cint : The hopping pattern of BLE connec-
tion is repetitive for a given channel map cmap . We leverage
this property to extract the connection interval cint during a
grace period when cmap remains unchanged . In this section,
we first prove that BLE hopping pattern is repetitive for a
given channel map and then describe the algorithm for the
derivation of connection interval.
Lemma IV.1. BLE channel hopping has a repetition period
of 37 for a given channel map.
Proof. According to the Linear Congruential Generator algo-
rithm [23], the sequence of pseudo-random values is given
by,
xn+1 = (axn + c) modm (1)
when, c , 0, xn will have a period of m if and only if
(i) m and c are relatively prime
(ii) a − 1 is divisible by all prime factors of m and
(iii) a − 1 is divisible by 4 if m is divisible by 4
In BLE AFH, the channel selection algorithm is given by,
cunmapped = (luc + hinc)mod 37, (2)
It has the same form as Eq. (1) for a = 1. Moreover, given 37
is a prime number, it satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii). Thus,
we claim that the AFH pattern in BLE communication has a
period of m = 37. 
Fig. 3 shows the repetitive property of a BLE connection.
When there is no cmap update, the hopping pattern repeat
itself every T intervals, where T = 37*cint . For determining
connection interval, we set the sniffer to stay at single fre-
quency channel (e.g., channel 0) and record the time difference
∆t between adjacent packet receptions. We then compare and
analyze the set of ∆t’ in real-time and find the repetitive pattern
among them. For accuracy, we compare this pattern for a
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Figure 3: BLE frequency hopping diagram where the
blue block represents the observed channel
defined repetitions (e.g., 3). The sum of all ∆t’ in a single
pattern is T which accounts for 37 hops. Then, the connection
interval is calculated as
cint =
1
37
∑
∆t (3)
As shown in Fig. 3, it is important to note that a channel
may appear multiple times within a 37-hop period (i.e., T)
when the number of used channels in cmap is less than 37.
Among these appearances, only one channel is truly mapped
while the rest are re-mapped.
2) Determining hinc: Suppose at time t1 we observe chan-
nel c1 and then we jump to channel c2 and observe it at time
t2. Then, the total number of hops from c1 to c2 is given by
h =
∆t2 − ∆t1
cint
. (4)
According to [17], we can determine the hinc as follows:
hinc =
(c2 − c1)−1
h
mod 37 (5)
Here, the integer hinc ∈ [5, 16]. If the channel c1 and c2
appear only once within period T , they are truly mapped
channels and we can determine hinc using Eq. (5). However,
in reality, channel map cmap generally contains less than 37
channels and each channel can appear multiple times within
T , as the channel 0 (blue block) shown in Fig. 3. In this case,
Eq. (5) would give a wrong hinc if any of channel c1 and c2
is remapped. In general, suppose there are n appearances in
c1 and m appearances in c2 within each period T . We would
have n×m hop increment values for any combination of these
channels. It is mathematically infeasible to determine which
hinc is the correct one, although we could narrow down the
searching space by eliminating hinc < [5, 16]. In light of this,
if observing two channels would not give a valid while unique
hinc , we observe a third channel c3 which may also appear l
times within period T , as shown in Fig. 4. In so doing, we find
the hop increment hm,l from channel c2 and c3. By intersecting
two results, namely hn,m and hm,l , the correct hinc would be
identified. Although we may need to observe more channels
in extreme cases, our empirical study shows hinc is found by
observing at most three channels by applying a probabilistic
rule that the mostly appeared (over 50%) hinc is the correct
one. In this case, the specific combination of c1, c2 and c3
that gives the correct hinc are true channels. To give a clear
picture, the algorithm for determining hinc is stated below.
T 2T0
Time
F
re
q
u
en
cy
2402 MHz
2406 MHz
2404 MHz
KT
Figure 4: Determining hop increment given multiple
appearances of a channel within period T
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for determining hinc
Input: Initialize set P containing observations of c1
Output: hinc
hop to channel c2 and observe for time T and generate set
Q containing observations of c2;
hop to channel c3 and repeat prior step to generate set R;
3: for n ∈ P and m ∈ Q do
calculate hn,m =
(c2−c1)−1
h mod 37
if hn,m ∈ [5, 16] then
6: for l ∈ R do
calculate hm,l =
(c3−c2)−1
h mod 37
if hn,m = hm,l then
9: store hn,m in set J
save < n,m, l > as true channels
end if
12: end for
end if
end for
3) Determining cmap: To get cmap , we let the sniffer mimic
victim BLE devices’ behavior that runs the same channel
hopping algorithm as in Eq. (2) based on the derived cint
and hinc . In so doing, after 37 hops, the attacker shall know
which channels are in cmap and which are not. However,
the starting channel luc must be a truly mapped channel;
otherwise, the attacker loses synchronization with the victim
BLE connection. Therefore, after determining hinc , we first
move to a truly mapped channel luc determined in the previous
step. We then use Eq. (2) to calculate the next channel to be
hopped and move to that channel earlier than the victim BLE
devices (e.g., cint2 sooner). This ensures that we have enough
time to observe the connection on that channel. We repeat the
above process till completing all 37 hops. If we observe target
AA in any channel we mark it as Used, otherwise we mark it
as Unused. Upon completion, the set of Used channels is the
channel map of the current BLE connection. The algorithm
for determining the channel map is stated below.
Now we know all parameters required to follow a BLE
connection. One important thing to note is that when channel
map updates, we will not be able to immediately detect it
as this information is encrypted in the payload. As a result,
we may lose synchronization with the BLE connection and
our sniffing performance will be hampered. To mitigate this
problem, we keep track of the number of missed packets in a
sliding window. If it exceeds a certain threshold, we assume
that a channel map update has taken place and we re-run Alg.
5Algorithm 2 Algorithm for determining of cmap
Input: Initialize luc = observed truly mapped channel, hinc
Output: cmap
for count = 1, count ≤ 37, count++ do
set channel = (luc + hinc)mod 37
if packet containing target AA is observed then
4: mark the channel as Used
append it to cmap
else
set the channel as Unused
8: end if
end for
2 to calculate the channel map. Recall that cint and hinc do
not change during the BLE connection.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of our algo-
rithm. We first describe the setup and evaluation metrics, and
then discuss results in details.
A. Experiment Setup
We implement our algorithm in the open source platform
Ubertooth One. To develop the firmware and program, we use
the Ubertooth One with a Linux based PC. As shown in Fig.
5, our experiment platform consists of two Ubertooth One
devices connected to a Linux PC. One of them runs the default
Follow Mode (as benchmark) whereas the other one runs our
developed algorithms. We use Cypress BLE platforms as test
devices and setup one device as the master and another one
as the slave. The main reason for choosing Cypress is that
it provides a controlled environment that can freely change
AFH parameters. This gives us enough flexibility to test our
algorithms for different settings.
We carry out several experiments that were necessary to
understand the BLE characteristics and evaluate the perfor-
mance of our developed algorithms. Specifically, we perform
the following experiments:
1) We evaluate the accuracy and latency of our algorithms
in extracting the AFH parameters. In this case, we set the
cmap to update every 15s, 30s and 60s respectively.
2) Next, we compare the performance of our system in
sniffing data packets with that of Ubertooth One in follow
mode. The follow mode needs to observe BLE adver-
tisements and look for a connection request packet from
which it will extract all the required AFH parameters.
After that, it goes to the data channel and starts to follow
the connection. We then run our sniffer, which starts to
follow the connection after extracting AFH parameters
from data channels. Now, we send 100 data packets every
100ms in the first setting and 250ms in the second one.
B. Performance Analysis Of AFH Parameter Calculation
First, we present the theoretical analysis of computation
overhead of determining each AFH parameter. For cint , we
SLAVE
Ubertooth One
In Follow Mode
MASTER
Ubertooth One
Running Sniffing
Algorithm
Sniffed Data On
Host PC
Figure 5: Experiment setup in an indoor controlled
environment
need to observe the connection for at least 2T i.e., 2 × 37
hops. For accuracy, we observe the connection for nT interval
and compare the hopping pattern for n times, where n > 2. In
so doing, we increase the accuracy but incurs higher latency.
In a non-ideal case where channel map updates during cint
calculation, this will increase the time taken for determining
cint . For hinc , ideally observing 3 channels in 3T shall yield
the correct hop increment. However, if we want more accuracy,
we observe k different channels for kT time, where k ≥ 3.
Next for cmap , we first pick a truly mapped channel and
then continue to hop for T , which theoretically would give
us cmap . However, if there is a channel map update during
cmap calculation, the hopping pattern will change and we will
have wrong values in cmap . Thus, the latency for determining
cmap could be any multiplier of period T .
Experimentally, the accuracy of determining the AFH pa-
rameters is given in Table I. Besides, Fig. 6a shows the latency
(calculated in terms of hops) of correctly determining AFH
parameters for same settings of cint and hinc but different
frequencies of cmap update. From Fig. 6a, we see that the
latency decreases as the frequency of cmap update increases
which justifies our previous reasoning.
C. Performance Evaluation of Packet Sniffing
We now evaluate the performance of our system in sniffing
data packets and compare it with the Ubertooth One in follow
mode. Two separate settings are examined where 100 data
packets are transmitted every 100ms and every 250ms, re-
spectively. During data transmissions, we update BLE devices’
channel map based on a predefined frequency. From Fig. 6b
and Fig. 6c, we observe that the accuracy for our sniffer
increases as the frequency of cmap update decreases. This
is because the connection stays stable (i.e., AFH parameters
remain unchanged) for long time and we do not need to run
our algorithm frequently. On the other hand, the Ubertooth
One follow mode exhibit the opposite trend. This is because
the follow mode relies on BLE control packets to keep track
of channel map.
However, the performance of follow mode shows a larger
variance than ours. The reason is that if the follow mode
615s 30s 60s
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Figure 6: (a) latency in deriving AFH parameters; (b) sniffing accuracy in 100ms data sending rate; (c) sniffing accuracy in
250ms setting.
Parameter 15s 30s 60s
cint 100% 100% 100%
hinc 100% 96% 96%
cmap 100% 96% 96%
Table I: Accuracy for determining BLE AFH parameters
misses the packet containing cmap update, it will not be able
to re-sync until it receives the next cmap update packet. On
the contrary, our sniffer does not rely on BLE control packets.
Whenever it gets de-synchronized with the BLE connection,
it re-runs the cmap algorithm to resume following the BLE
connection.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented algorithms to determine the
BLE connection parameters to crack its adaptive frequency
hopping protocol, which leads to accurately sniffing BLE
long-lived connections. We implemented our algorithms in
the open source platform–Ubertooth One and evaluated its
performance against a benchmark scheme. Our experimental
results demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed algorithms
in terms of low latency and high accuracy. We see that our
algorithms can calculate AFH parameters with 96% accuracy
and sniff more than 80% of the transmitted data.
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